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Egbert, Henrik. (2017). The Gift and the Centipede. Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences, 10(1).   The Gift and the Centipede  Henrik Egbert Anhalt University of Applied Sciences Department of Economics Bernburg, Germany henrik.egbert@hs-anhalt.de    This paper addresses the similarity between behavioural economics and social anthropology with respect to approaches on repeated reciprocity. The case at hand is the application of the Centipede game to Marcel Mauss’s concept of the Gift. In a Centipede game players interact in an alternating sequence of decisions to take or to pass an endowment. Mauss describes sequences of reciprocal giving in potlatch cultures, in which strict obligations determine choice options. The paper shows that models developed in behavioural economics, such as the Centipede game, can also be applied to prominent contexts in economic anthropology.  Keywords: Gift, Centipede game, Potlatch game, Marcel Mauss, reciprocity    Introduction  The work of Marcel Mauss is mostly unknown to economists. Only few references to the Gift, Mauss’ best known work, are to be found in the economic literature (e.g. Kranton, 1996). This is also true for behavioural economics even if authors from this field regularly address topics such as reciprocity and other forms of non-selfish behavior. These topics are closely related to the Gift. Economic anthropologists also tend to be scarcely aware of the developments in behavioural economics and the related research methods and findings. They appear, instead, to nourish the long established enemy image of neoclassical theory (e.g. Hann & Hart, 2011). By and large, applications of behavioural economics methodologies are rarely found (but see Henrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2001). Mutual acceptance of key concepts and knowledge about different methodologies of the other discipline, however, may be fertile ground for developing existing concepts further. This short note addresses a specific case. It states that the concept of the Gift, as developed by Marcel Mauss (1923/1924) nearly 100 years ago, can serve as a contextual framework of the Centipede game. The Centipede game is one of the workhorses used in behavioural economics and it has been tested in many different variations in the lab and in the field. The purpose of this note is not only to bring Mauss’s work to the attention of economists, but also to attract anthropologists’ attention to methods used in economics which can be fruitfully applied to their research topics. The structure of the text is as follows: Section 2 briefly outlines the idea of the Gift. Section 3 introduces a standard Centipede game and provides a short literature review 
  
of empirical findings. Sections 4 sets the Centipede game in the context of the Gift and addresses similarities and dissimilarities. Section 5 is dedicated to the discussion of game trees. The last section concludes.  The Gift  Marcel Mauss’s (1990) concept of the Gift has to be considered within his general approach to society. According to him individual decisions depend on both individual freedom and social obligations (Hart, 2007:481). Mauss (1990:70) writes that a citizen “[…] must act by taking into account his own interests, and those of society and its subgroups.” In this sense a person acts as an individual within a given social context. Mauss (1990:39-43) examines the Gift in specific potlatch cultures and also in a European historical context and refers to three immanent obligations. Firstly, he addresses the ‘obligation to give’. This obligation is central for groups and for individuals within a given social order as to preserve a social position through the signalling and demonstration of wealth, fortune, being blessed by the spirits and gods, etc. This obligation goes hand in hand with a compulsory invitation to gift giving occasions, i.e. the spread of information to all potential receivers of gifts before a gift-giving occasion, for instance the invitation to a feast. Secondly, the invited are ‘obliged to accept’ the invitation. They have only few reasons to refuse. Moreover, a ‘burden’ (Mauss, 1990:41) is attached to the gift and its acceptance. This burden becomes obvious in the third obligation, i.e. recipients of a gift have the ‘obligation to reciprocate’ in the future. In the specific form of the potlatch, the value of the reciprocation should be higher than the value of the gift received. Indeed, with the fulfilment of this third obligation a new round of reciprocal exchange is likely to start. Any violation of these obligations, e.g. not to invite, to decline an invitation, to reject a gift, or an insufficient reciprocation of the gift, inevitably has social consequences for the offender or her group. Social costs can be a loss of social esteem, status, power, etc. Mauss’s system of total services can be understood as a decision and allocation system within an institutional setting. It includes collective entities, rules and obligations for exchange (Douglas, 1990:5). Mauss regards families, clans and tribes as collective entities who engage in exchange. Exchange in this system is compulsory and ubiquitous. Douglas (1990:5) provides examples for exchange objects and occasions such as banquets, rituals, military services, human beings, and cultural activities. An initial gift induces reciprocal returns and a permanent exchange within a society. On the one hand, a gift stabilizes social relations between individuals and groups. On the other hand, reciprocal exchange has a strong competitive element if one group or individual tries to outperform opponents. It is important to note that, according to Mauss, the Gift is understood as a universal pattern (see Hann, 2006:208; Liebersohn, 2011:139-163; Mauss, 1990:71-83) and can be applicable to modern market exchange as well as to archaic exchange (see also Hart, 2007). Recently, Egbert and Sedlarski have pronounced the compatibility of Mauss’s ideas with concepts in new institutional economics and business administration (Egbert, 2017; Egbert & Sedlarski, 2016).  The Centipede Game  Economic experiments prove that people do not always take decisions as predicted by neoclassical theory. In many cases individuals do not behave selfishly. A case at hand is the Centipede game (Rosenthal, 1981). In this game two players A and B take sequential decisions. We assume that player A is the first player. Player A has the option to take 
 ‘something valuable’. In an experimental settingthat represent money. In the game maximizing the number of tokens would be a rational aim of a selfish person.take the tokens, she can pass them to player B. In this case either to take or to pass. A game tree  Figure 1: A Centipede Game
 Source: Adopted from McKelvy & Palfrey  The two players are A and Bdecision’ by p. If a player chooseFor instance, if A chooses t (always the first number of the number). But if A chooses p, it can be seen, the sum of the tokens always doubles In neoclassical theory rational and are fully informed about the structurefinal node. A player maximizea terminal node exists, the game last node her pay-offs between that B is rational at node 4 and will choose Thus the backward induction Nash equilibrium: both players choose her first node and reciprocal behaviour would not be possible to occur.However, empirical studiesequilibrium. Only few players sto(1992) are the first who test the game experimentally. They participants stop the game at the first node the last node. A large body of empirical and theoretical research was game (for brief surveys see 418). Next, some empirical findings are summarized.Nagel & Tang (1998) additionally consider the learning effects. In a constant sum gamecan only lose if she plays pass, Fey, McKelvey & Pparticipants who end the game early in order to investigate trust-building among strangersthe influence of high pay-offsparticipants to choose ‘take’                                                           1 The review is confined to selected games which allow observing direct reciprocity because this is the closest to the Gift concepts. Similar Centipede games can also be used to show indirect reciprocity (Greiner & Levati, 2005; Danese & Mittone, 2015).
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a three-person game with nine stages (Rapoport et al., 2003). Palacios-Huerta & Volij (2009) conduct a field experiment with chess players and show that individuals who are trained in backward induction reasoning very often end the game early, i.e. their decisions are more in line with predictions derived from neoclassical theory. Other studies focus on cooperative behaviour. In an experiment with a mixed population of humans and robots, Murphy, Rapoport & Parco (2004) test how the number of cooperative players in a population influences outcomes. Bornstein, Kugler & Ziegelmeyer (2005) test the effect of groups as players and find that groups choose the ‘take’ option earlier than individual players. These and a number of other studies2 reveal those variables that increase the share of participants who stop the game comparatively early: a constant pie (Fey, McKelvey & Palfrey, 1996), very high stakes (Rapoport et al., 2003; Parco, Rapoport & Stein, 2002), more than two players (Rapoport et al., 2003), if groups and not individuals are the players (Bornstein, Kugler & Ziegelmeyer, 2005), and individual training in backward induction reasoning (Palacios-Huerta & Volij, 2009). They also show that participants play ‘take’ at later nodes if the percentage of cooperative players in the population increases (Murphy, Rapoport & Parco 2004), and if the game has many decision nodes.  The Centipede and the Gift  Many similarities between the concept of the Gift and the Centipede game are apparent. Besides, there are also differences which require elaboration in order to make the game applicable to a Gift context. Next, the similarities are outlined before addressing the differences. In a model two largely homogenous groups can be depicted by two individuals. For instance, player A and player B could be chiefs of clans or tribes who have similar preferences and interests similar to the groups they represent. If chief A provides chief B with an initial gift, this action can induce repeated direct reciprocal behaviour between the two chiefs. This is what is described in the Gift concept and is also depicted in Centipede games. In both contexts the initial endowment is exogenously given. In the Gift context, for instance, the initial gift could be the result of a particularly good harvest, in the Centipede game an experimenter provides the initial endowment. Another structural resemblance is related to the second obligation outlined by Mauss (1990:41). It states that a gift must be accepted and can hardly be rejected by the receiver. That is exactly depicted in a Centipede game: If a player passes, the receiving player has no option to reject. Furthermore, when Mauss states that a ‘burden’ is attached to a gift, this burden is modelled in the pay-off structure of the game. The burden is the interest that a receiver has to repay with her reciprocal giving. In many Centipede games the interest can be found in the sum of tokens that a person passes because the sum steadily increases (see Figure 1). There is also a similarity in the assumption of economic theories and Mauss that individuals exchange something of value. Mauss outlines in detail how ‘things’ that have a magic value for groups can become money within these groups (see Hahn, Schmidt & Seitz, 2015 for an anthology of Mauss’ writings on money). In order to make a ‘thing’ an appropriate object for exchange in groups, i.e. to serve as a gift, A and B (and the groups they represent) must have a similar value system with respect to these things. While in                                                            2 For a recent analysis based on verbal protocol taken during a Centipede game see Krockow, Colman & Pulford (2016). 
  
some societies food, blankets, invitations, salt, or labour constitute such things, in other societies these things can be tokens which can be exchanged for money. Money, as used in economic experiments, is simply a specific case of a wide variety of possible valuable objects which could also be used in experiments. The innate assumption of the Centipede game and of the Gift is that those who interact in exchange have to posses similar value systems about the ‘things’ that are exchanged. The third parallel is that empirical findings in anthropological research and in experimental economics show that many people do not always behave selfishly. Instead, they have other regarding preferences, reciprocity being one of them (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Thus empirical findings from the Centipede game and other experiments (e.g., the Trust game) go hand in hand with observations of direct reciprocal behaviour as described by Mauss for potlatches and other social arrangements.3 Apart from these similarities, there are differences as well. One difference is that in an experiment, players physically receive the final pay-off but not intermediate pay-offs. For instance, if player A chooses the take option at node three (Figure 1), then players physically receive 16, respectively 4 tokens but they do not receive tokens at nodes one and two because they have chosen to pass. In contrast to that, the Gift addresses a physical transfer of valuables every time when players interact. One may argue that the physical presence of the objects influences the decisions. If such an endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) exists, it is reasonable to assume that fewer players would pass at initial nodes. However, this is only a minor point since the game could be played with physical objects being given to the players at every node. The two remaining aspects address more striking differences. Both are related to the ‘obligations’, i.e. the institutional setting assumed in the Gift concept. The above Centipede game does not include socially determined obligations. An anonymous player who ends the game by choosing the take option is not exposed to social costs. In the Gift concept social costs exist because it is an innate consequence of the ‘obligations’. Since in the Gift concept social rules dictate to give, to accept and to return, an individual in this institutional context will always accept and reciprocate if means allow her to do so and even if social costs are comparatively high. Social costs are, for instance, loss of reputation, loss of rank, or social exclusion which a society puts on the offender. If these costs are high, a decision maker will continue the process of reciprocal giving, once she has initially given a gift or has accepted one. The only option to avoid this repeated circle is to abstain from the first transfer (see the example given in Hann, 2006:209). The other foremost difference is related to utility. In a Centipede game it is assumed that for a rational player her utility u increases with the number of tokens she receives. This means that more tokens are strictly preferred to fewer tokens. Thus the players’ utilities are related to the size of the pay-offs, for instance 32 > 16 implies that u(32) > u(16). In the concept of the Gift this is different. The utility for a person derives from the act of giving because giving is the visible fulfilment of an obligation, i.e. to pass something valuable to others. In the specific social context of a potlatch that includes aspects of religion and politics, to give away more goods is better, because generous giving means an increase of social esteem. Thus the ‘take’ decision, i.e. the decision not to give and not to share causes in the Gift context a lower utility than the ‘pass’ decision. The next section provides two game trees and outlines that the concept of the Gift can be described as Centipede games.                                                            3 This does not imply that in repeated interaction reciprocal behavior can be a form of utility maximizing behavior of selfish individuals. 
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 Let us assume that 10). Player A has at node one the option to pass the for both players is that a received gift can be returned with a discountexample, we assume that the at the n’s node with n = e+1. With an endowment of 10in the game. In order to illustrate the payare at node three in Figure 3. If A chooses But if A passes and B chooses the utility of -7. As one can see,The best decision for both players fully reciprocated and social costs are zero.Two questions can be discount depict social situations? Indeed, the discount on a gift may where social norms to reciprocate are fully in power, howeverobligations are getting weaker the longer the game is playedprovides narratives of such situationsgenerations (Mauss, 1990:71Rational players who avoid social costs have seen from the original sense of utility maximizing, Gift Game with discount some pspecific case it means that they  Conclusion  This note states that concepts and mcan be usefully applied in economists have gone much beyond economics. They have formed and those that are related to pWhile neoclassical theory still 2014 and the comment byacknowledged that this theory The neighbouring social sciencesfundamental change of thinking within anthropologists still emphasise 
                                                          4 For simplicity reasons it is assumed that the utility of the players does not include the saved discount. It is assumed to be zero.
 
nature N endows player A with 10 units of endowment as a gift. 
discount is -1 at every node. As a consequence, player A is the first and last player -offs for a ‘take’ decision, let us assume t, then her utility is -8 and the utility of ‘take’ option at node four, A has a utility of  the pay-offs converge to zero the longer the game is played. still is always to pass until the final node when the gift is  tackled here. Firstly, does such a Gift gmirror, change occurs and  in a society that indicate social change -78). Secondly, do players play such a situation untilwould play the game to the end. However, as we Centipede game, some people do not behave rationalthey cooperate instead. Thus a hypothesis can read layers do not obey obligations but play irrationalstop the game before the end and accept social costs.
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social sciences and reduce the former largely to neoclassical theory. An example is a leading and generally excellent textbook of Hann and Hart (2011:162) who state that “[T]he project of economics needs to be rescued from the economists”. Such claims are in as much counterproductive to interdisciplinary work as positions held by some economists who do not deal in depth with valuable concepts developed in anthropology. The objective of this note was to show that even core topics in economic anthropology, such as Marcel Mauss’s Gift can be related to models and methodologies used in economics, for instance, in behavioural economics. The case employed in this paper is the model of a Centipede game applied to a gift-giving context.   
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